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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress scrapped parole in 1984,1 the move eliminated a highly criticized 
source of uncertainty and disparity in federal sentencing,2 but the decision to replace it 
with the supervised release system has created problems of its own. On the surface, the 
two systems are virtually indistinguishable. Both permit the government to impose a 
period of conditional freedom on defendants as they return to the community, and both 
provide for revocation of that freedom when the conditions are violated. A subtle structural 
difference, however, makes revocation of supervised release reliant on a legal fiction not 
required to justify revocation of parole. This fiction may have been justifiable at one time, 
but several provisions in the supervised release statute as it exists today, including one 
recently invalidated by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Haymond,3 have stretched the 
legal sleight of hand beyond constitutionally permissible limits.  
The narrow question in Haymond is whether a statute providing for mandatory 
revocation and a five-year minimum term of imprisonment violates the Fifth and Sixth 
amendments when the defendant’s underlying offense has no mandatory term of 
imprisonment and the fact triggering revocation has not been presented to a jury or proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the case implicates a broader issue: whether a 
judge’s factual determinations at revocation can mandate or make available punishment 
beyond that otherwise mandated or available based on the defendant’s original conviction 
alone. In order to bring clarity to the confused body of law surrounding supervised release 
and to establish constitutional constraints on a currently boundless system, the Supreme 
Court should grant certiorari in Haymond and affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision.  
The nature of supervised release, and the leap of legal logic on which it relies, can 
best be explained by way of a brief illustration. Consider the following hypothetical: Park 
rangers catch a hiker selling marijuana to campers in a national park, and a jury later 
convicts him of distribution of marijuana substance, leading to a sentence of five years in 
prison, the maximum available under the law, to be followed by two years of supervised 
release.4 Shortly after completing his prison term, the hiker is arrested again, this time for 
possession of cocaine, leading his probation officer to petition the court for revocation of 
                                                          
 1. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. Congress adopted the supervised 
release system in 1984 as part of a larger sentencing reform that also established the current system of sentencing 
guidelines. The principle statute establishing the rules for supervised release was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583. 
The parole system that it replaced had been codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218. 
 2. S. REP. No. 98-223, at 35 (1983). 
 3. See United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 15, 
2018) (No. 17-1672). 
 4. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). 
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the hiker’s release. At the hiker’s revocation hearing, the judge serves as factfinder,5 
permits hearsay testimony,6 determines the hiker’s guilt based on a preponderance of the 
evidence,7 and sentences the him to two years in prison. When the hiker protests, the judge 
explains that defendants facing revocation do not enjoy the full panoply of procedural 
rights due during a criminal prosecution. Rest assured, the judge says, had the government 
chosen to send the hiker to prison in the traditional way, the constitution would have 
protected his rights to a jury trial,8 confrontation of witnesses,9 and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.10 
The hypothetical, though admittedly absurd, raises serious questions. If certain 
conduct by a defendant renders him subject to revocation, and the same conduct renders 
him subject to criminal prosecution, what accounts for the differing procedural protections 
with respect to the manner in which the government is allowed to prove that conduct?  
Herein lies the legal fiction underpinning supervised release: the law considers 
revocation to punish a defendant’s original offense even though a defendant free on 
supervised has served his original prison sentence to completion.11 In other words, the 
judge’s determination that the cocaine belonged to the hiker made the prison term possible, 
but the prison term itself was additional punishment for the sale of marijuana to campers 
on federal property. Because the hiker presumably enjoyed full constitutional protections 
when he was prosecuted on the marijuana charge, the judge was not required to afford 
those protections again as he considered whether to impose additional punishment related 
to that conviction.12  
This rationale raises another question, though. If the law treats revocation as 
punishment for a defendant’s original offense, and the maximum penalty for the hiker’s 
original offense was five years in prison, how could the judge impose a revocation term 
that resulted in a total prison sentence of seven years? Circuit courts have yet to provide a 
satisfactory answer to this question despite universally holding such revocation terms to 
be permissible. 
Courts never had to consider this issue during the parole era.  Under the parole 
system, a defendant was released before he had completed his original sentence. If he 
violated his parole conditions, revocation merely resulted in the re-imposition of his 
remaining prison term. Because the revocation sanction was, quite literally, the 
punishment for his original offense, revocation of parole could expose a defendant to no 
                                                          
 5. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (noting that defendants are not entitled to a jury 
trial when supervise release is revoked because the defendant engaged in new criminal conduct). 
 6. See United States v. Mosley, 759 F.3d 664, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that hearsay is admissible in 
a revocation hearing when the out of court statement is sufficiently reliable). 
 7. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700 (noting that violations of supervised release need only be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence). 
 8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”). 
 9. See Fed. R. Evid. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible . . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 10. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be 
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.”). 
 11. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 701. 
 12. For a discussion of the case law relevant to this point, see infra notes 77–90 and accompanying text. 
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more punishment than he faced the day he was sentenced. 
If revocation of supervised release were similarly constrained, the legal fiction that 
revocation punishes a defendant’s original offense would arguably be justified. The threat 
of revocation allows judges to efficiently enforce the conditions they impose on defendants 
as they are reintegrated into civil society. Were courts obliged to empanel a jury and the 
government to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the system would almost certainly 
grind to a halt. Moreover, supervised release has several advantages over parole. Whereas 
parole was managed by prison bureaucrats rather than the courts, supervised release gives 
judges direct control over a defendant’s punishment from start to finish, fostering certainty 
and transparency in sentencing.13 
Under the current statute, however, the claim that revocation punishes a defendant’s 
original offense strains credulity. Rather than tying post-revocation sanctions to a 
defendant’s underlying conviction, several provisions prescribe additional revocation 
penalties for specific kinds of violations.14 Moreover, courts have repeatedly held that 
revocation is permissible even when the additional term of incarceration would result in a 
cumulative prison sentence that exceeds the maximum provided for in the statute under 
which the defendant was originally convicted.15 
These provisions are at odds with the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence and 
the Constitution. The Framers, wary of government overreach, sought to protect 
defendants by establishing certain procedural bulwarks such as the Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial and Fifth Amendment right to due process of law, which, in the criminal 
context, has long been understood to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.16 Because 
these protections are only in place during the conviction phase of the defendant’s trial, the 
Supreme Court requires his punishment to be limited to that made available by the facts 
proven during that phase alone. Revocation of supervised release, therefore, is 
unconstitutional when it would alter the boundaries of the penalty range to which the 
defendant was originally subject at sentencing.  
Haymond, a 2017 case that was pending certiorari as of this note’s publication, 
represents the first time that a court has invalidated a revocation provision on the grounds 
that it altered the boundaries of a defendant’s available sentencing range based on facts 
never presented to a jury, violating his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.17 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision was limited to a relatively narrow provision in the supervised 
release statute, but the court’s reasoning has broad implications for the supervised release 
program as a whole, breathing new life into an argument that courts have largely ignored,18 
                                                          
 13.   Part II of this note discusses the reasons why Congress adopted supervised release in lieu of parole as 
well as the structural differences between the two systems. 
 14. See infra notes 52–63 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). 
 17. 869 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 18. See Brett M. Shockley, Note, Protecting Due Process from the Protect Act: The Problems with Increasing 
Periods of Supervised Release for Sexual Offenders, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353 (2010). Mr. Shockley’s note 
was prescient. Examining the same statute as the one at issue in Haymond, he identified many of the constitutional 
defects that the Tenth Circuit later cited in Haymond. See id. at 359. However, the law has evolved significantly 
since 2010, and Mr. Shockley’s work did not thoroughly address the legal reasoning employed by the circuit 
courts on this issue. See id. at 377–78. This note advances the scholarship in two ways. First, it offers a more 
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often as a result of poorly argued or meritless challenges.19 
This note presents a roadmap of the law underpinning Haymond and argues that the 
Tenth Circuit got right what so many other circuit courts have gotten wrong. Part II, which 
follows this introduction, traces the historical trends that led Congress to abandon parole 
in favor of supervised release and explains the structural difference between the two 
systems. Part III examines the Supreme Court cases that form the constitutional boundaries 
within which supervised release should be contained. In Johnson v. United States, the 
Court held that post-revocation sanctions must be attributed to the original offense.20 This 
mandate is in tension with the sentencing principles articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey 
and its progeny, a line of cases in which the Court defined the limits of judicial fact-finding 
in sentencing.21 Part IV analyzes the manner in which the Tenth Circuit attempted to 
resolve that tension in Haymond. 
Finally, Part V of this note explains the principles underpinning Haymond and 
argues that, under the Court’s precedents in Johnson and Apprendi, revocation of 
supervised release is unconstitutional in all cases where revocation is mandatory and in 
any case where revocation exposes the defendant to punishment beyond the statutory 
maximum authorized by his original conviction. With the exception of Haymond, the 
circuit courts have consistently refused to impose these constitutional limits, but, as Part 
V explains, the uniformity masks an underlying weakness in the courts’ understanding of 
the applicable Supreme Court precedent. 
The government has a legitimate interest in maintaining a system of supervised 
release, but that interest does not extend to the use of revocation as a vehicle for 
extraconstitutional punishment. Reduced procedural protections are permissible when 
revocation punishes a defendant’s original offense, but revocation cannot reasonably be 
said to punish a defendant’s original offense if the revocation results in punishment that 
would not have been permitted or required upon his conviction at trial. If the government 
wishes to punish a defendant’s subsequent conduct, rather than his original offense, it must 
prove that conduct to a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
II.  FROM PAROLE TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 
Much of the confusion regarding the constitutional limits of revocation can be 
attributed to the courts’ failure to properly recognize and account for the structural 
difference between supervised release and parole. This distinction—the ultimate source of 
the supervise release system’s constitutional vulnerability—arose as a byproduct of a 
larger shift in sentencing practices.        
                                                          
comprehensive analysis of the key precedents, including an important Supreme Court decision that post-dates 
Mr. Shockley’s work. See infra Part III. Second, the note provides a thorough rebuttal of the arguments on which 
the circuit courts have relied to reject supervised release challenges. See infra Part V.   
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. 529 U.S. 694 (2000). 
 21. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely 
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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A. Sentencing: Determinate to Indeterminate and Back Again 
Parole emerged in the late nineteenth century as a progressive penal reform premised 
on the idea that the primary purpose of punishment should be rehabilitation rather than 
retribution.22 In the early days of the Republic, when incarceration was a relatively novel 
alternative to hanging or whipping in the town square, the structure of sentencing laws 
reflected their retributive purpose. The punishment was supposed to fit the crime, not the 
criminal, so the law provided a specific term of confinement for each offense.23 With 
limited exceptions, defendants served these terms in their entirety.24 These norms began 
to change, however, as reformation of the offender supplanted retribution as the primary 
justification for punishing him.25 By the late 1800s, penal theory viewed incarceration as 
an evil to be imposed no longer than was necessary to turn the offender from his evil 
ways.26 
Sentencing statutes soon began to reflect this philosophical shift, as lawmakers 
adopted mechanisms meant to tailor punishment to the needs of individual defendants. 
First, because a judge was in a better position to evaluate the defendant, legislators 
delegated their sentencing authority, the specific absolute prison terms with broad penalty 
ranges.27 Second, because each offender’s progress toward rehabilitation would be 
different and could not be known at the time of conviction, lawmakers began establishing 
parole boards, quasi-judicial arms of the prisons, to decide when a defendant was suitable 
for release back into society.28 This had the effect of rendering prison sentences partially 
indeterminate. As a practical matter, the judicial sentence served only to establish the 
boundaries of the board’s discretion, setting the date of a defendant’s parole eligibility and 
the date after which he could no longer be held in custody.29Although a defendant’s actual 
prison term had to fall within the range established by the judicial sentence, the precise 
magnitude of his punishment remained unknown at the time of sentencing.30 Advocates 
for this model viewed the system’s inherent uncertainty as a feature, not a bug.31 The 
prospect of early release, they argued, provided inmates with an incentive to reform, and 
the threat of revocation provided an incentive to stay reformed. 
                                                          
 22. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING §4.2 (3d ed. 2004), Westlaw (database updated September 
2017). 
 23. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978). 
 24. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892 (1990). 
 25. See Jacob Schuman, Sentencing Rules and Standards: How We Decide Criminal Punishment, 83 TENN. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (2015). 
 26. Charlton T. Lewis, Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 17 (1899) (“Since every man’s liberty is a 
sacred right, as far as it is consistent with the rights of his fellows, it would direct that no man be imprisoned 
unless it is clear that his freedom is dangerous to others, and that, when once imprisoned, no man be freed until 
the danger has ceased. This is the principle of what is inexactly called the indeterminate sentence.”). 
 27. See Schuman, supra note 25, at 8. 
 28. Hellen Leland Witmer, The History Theory and Results of Parole, 18 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 24, 53 (1927). 
 29. Under a truly indeterminate sentencing system, judges impose neither a minimum nor a maximum 
sentence, and defendants are released unconditionally when determined to be reformed. See Paul Tappan, 
Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 529–31 (1958). 
 30. See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, §4.2. 
 note 27, at 48–49. 
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The system gained popularity quickly. By the time Congress adopted parole in 1910, 
more than half the states already had similar systems in place.32 A congressional report 
declared approvingly that parole had “come to be regarded as humane, in the interests of 
sound policy and highly beneficial to the welfare of society.”33 By the mid-1940s, some 
form of parole had been universally adopted in every jurisdiction in the United States.34 
 In the 1960s, however, the tide began to turn, as a growing chorus began to question 
the wisdom and fairness of indeterminate sentencing.35 Many of the arguments against it 
undermined the basic assumptions that had led to its adoption in the first place. Data cast 
doubt on the supposed rehabilitative properties of incarceration.36 Even if prisons did 
rehabilitate some inmates, many, including former parole officials, doubted it was possible 
to accurately identify them.37 Moreover, critics decried the disparity that parole bred in 
sentencing, noting that some judges attempted to retain control over a defendant’s 
punishment by anticipating his parole date and attempting to adjust his sentence 
accordingly.38 
By the 1980s, Senator Edward Kennedy, the chief advocate for reform in Congress, 
had finally gained traction in his decade-long quest to abandon indeterminate sentencing 
at the federal level.39 Introducing his reform bill to Congress, Kennedy denounced the 
status quo: “The current system is actually a nonsystem. It is unfair to the defendant, the 
victim, and society. It defeats the reasonable expectation of the public that a reasonable 
penalty will be imposed at the time of the defendant’s conviction, and that a reasonable 
sentence actually will be served.”40 
Kennedy’s proposal sought to bring consistency and predictability to the penal 
system by making sentences determinate and reducing judicial discretion.41 Under the new 
system, a Sentencing Commission would formulate binding sentencing guidelines that 
systematically factored in the circumstances of a defendant’s crime and background.42 
Although the law did not change the broad sentencing ranges already in place for 
individual offenses, it restricted a judge’s discretion by requiring her to select a sentence 
within a narrow band computed by the guidelines. Because the nature of the defendant’s 
crime, not his rehabilitative progress, was to determine his prison sentence, the new system 
scrapped parole entirely.43 Congress approved the sentencing reforms in 1984 as part of a 
                                                          
 32. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, Pub. L. No. 61-269, 36 Stat. 819. 
 33. SYSTEM OF PAROLE FOR UNITED STATES PRISONERS, H.R. Rep. No. 61-1341, at 4. (2d Sess. 1910). 
 34. SOL RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION, 622 (2d ed. 1973). 
 35. Nagel, supra note 24, at 895. 
 36. Id. at 896. 
 37. Corrections: Federal and State Parole System: Hearing on H.R. 13118 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 695–96 (2d Sess. 1972) (statement of Leonard Orland, former member of 
the Connecticut Parole Board). 
 38. S. REP. No. 98-223, at 43 (1983). 
 39. For a history of sentencing reform, see generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing 
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). 
 40. S. REP. No. 98-223, at 34. 
 41. Stith & Koh, supra note 39, at 261. 
 42. S. REP. No. 98-223, at 51. 
 43. The bill directed the Sentencing Commission, in establishing the sentencing guidelines, to take into 
account the absence of parole by using the average sentence that defendants actually served for specific offenses 
as a starting point for its guideline range. However, the commission was not bound to adhere to this average. 
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larger crime bill backed by influential law-and-order Republicans.44 
B. The Structure of Supervised Release 
1. Distinguishing Between Parole and Supervised Release 
Kennedy and others on the Senate Committee on the Judiciary saw utility in 
supervising an inmate’s transition back into the community but found parole’s mechanism 
for providing that supervision inefficient.45 Because the availability and duration of parole 
were tied to a defendant’s remaining prison sentence, an unreformed inmate who served 
his full prison term could not be supervised upon his release since he had no prison time 
left to parole, while an exemplary inmate who earned parole at the earliest date possible 
would be subject to years of unnecessary supervision.46 Members of the committee found 
this structure to be perverse.47 Post-release supervision, they argued, should be based on 
the needs of each defendant rather than the existence of unserved prison time, which, in 
any case, could not exist without preserving the indeterminacy that the reform was meant 
to abolish.48 
The new system, which they dubbed “supervised release,” avoided these problems 
by decoupling the availability and duration of the supervision period from the defendant’s 
initial prison term. Rather than release prisoners early so they could be supervised on 
parole, the new system empowered judges to order a period of post-release supervision 
along with a defendant’s initial prison sentence, which she would have to serve in full.49 
This innovation gave rise to the key structural difference between parole and supervised 
release. Whereas parole granted a period of conditional freedom in lieu of a defendant’s 
remaining prison sentence, supervised release imposed a period of conditional freedom in 
addition to a defendant’s already completed prison sentence. 
2. The Punitive Drift of Supervised Release 
Today’s supervised release statute bears little resemblance to the one Congress 
originally adopted.50 In its initial form, supervised release not only eliminated the parole 
system’s “carrot” (early release), it also did away with the parole system’s “stick” 
(revocation).51 To the extent that a defendant was to be sanctioned for violating the 
conditions of his release, the supervised release statute provided only that she be held in 
contempt of court.52 Violations constituting criminal conduct in their own right were to be 
                                                          
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Tit. II, Ch. 58, Sec. 994, Pub. L. No. 98–473 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(m)). 
 44. See Stith & Koh, supra note 39, at 261. 
 45. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 122–23. 
 46. Id. at 125 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §3583. 
 50. Compare Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §3583, with 18 U.S.C. § 3583. 
 51. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §3583(e). 
 52. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 125. 
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prosecuted in the traditional manner.53 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, reporting 
Kennedy’s bill to the Senate floor, explicitly rejected parole’s punitive approach: 
The Committee has concluded that the sentencing purposes of incapacitation and punishment 
would not be served by a term of supervised release—that the primary goal of such a term is 
to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the service of a long prison term 
for a particularly serious offense, or to provide re-habilitation to a defendant who has spent 
a fairly short period in prison. . . but still needs supervision and training programs after 
release.54 
This model of supervised release, with its focus on reintegration, was signed into 
law but never implemented.55 In 1985, two years before the supervised release program 
was to go into effect, President Reagan’s Department of Justice asked Congress to amend 
the statute to allow for revocation.56 Congress approved the amendment the following year 
as part of sweeping anti-drug legislation.57  
The reintroduction of revocation gave the unique structure of supervised release a 
new significance. Under parole, both the supervision period and the revocation penalty 
were determined by the amount of time remaining on a defendant’s prison sentence when 
he was granted parole. Under supervised release, however, the term of supervision was 
limited in absolute terms. Although certain criminal statutes specified particular terms of 
supervision, the supervised release statute set a default term of three years for defendants 
convicted of serious felonies and two years for lesser felonies.58 By making these terms 
revocable, the amendment made it possible to add time to a defendant’s prison sentence, 
even if it exposed him to a total prison term exceeding the statutory maximum for his 
underlying offense.59 Subsequent amendments to the statute have invited routine 
exploitation of this structural loophole. 
In the thirty years since supervised release was first adopted, Congress has 
repeatedly amended the statute in ways that rendered it more punitive. During the crack 
epidemic of the 1980s, Congress made revocation of supervised release mandatory for 
violations stemming from possession of a controlled substance or a firearm.60 In 2001, 
                                                          
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 124. 
 55. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(B)(ii) (tying the effective date of the act 
to the adoption of the sentencing guidelines); Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1006 (1986) 
(amending the supervised release statute to provide for revocation); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
1.2 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1987) (establishing effective date of guidelines as Nov. 1, 1987). 
 56. See 131 CONG. REC. S 7399 (June 4, 1985) (Statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond introducing amendments 
on behalf of the Regan administration). Although the introduction of revocation substantially altered the nature 
of supervised release, Thurmond, in proposing the change, described the amendment as one of many “technical 
and minor changes” to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. Id.   
 57. Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1006 (1986) (amending the supervised release statute to 
provide for revocation). 
 58. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §3583(b). These terms were expanded in 1987 to 
five years for serious felonies and three years for lessor felonies. Sentencing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-182, Sec. 8.  
 59. Congress again amended the statute in 1994 to limit revocation terms to five years for class A felonies, 
three years for class B felonies, two years for class C or D felonies, and one year for misdemeanors. Violent 
Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Sec. 110505 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)).  
 60. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, Sec. 7303 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1) 
(requiring judges to revoke the release of defendants who possess a controlled substance); Violent Crime Control 
9
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after the September 11 terror attacks, Congress amended the statute to allow lifetime 
supervision of individuals convicted of terror-related crimes.61 In 2003, Congress did the 
same for sex offenders.62 Three years later, it added a provision that made revocation 
mandatory for sex offenders in certain circumstances and required sex offenders on 
supervised release to submit to warrantless searches.63 Several of these amendments are 
irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
At a more fundamental level, they are at odds with the notion that revocation punishes the 
original offense rather than a defendant’s violative conduct. 
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Johnson: Why Revocation Must Punish the Original Offense 
Courts initially disagreed on what revocation of supervised release was meant to 
punish. The conceptual conflict bubbled up in the wake of a 1988 amendment to the 
supervised release statute that provided for mandatory revocation. Whereas judges 
previously had discretion to decide when revocation was appropriate, the amendment 
rendered revocation obligatory when a defendant’s violation stemmed from the possession 
of a controlled substance.64  
A string of offenders challenged the provision, arguing that its application to their 
cases was ex post facto. Although the law was in place when they violated supervised 
release, it had not been at the time they committed their original offenses.65 
The Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause forbids “any law which imposes a 
punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes 
additional punishment to that then prescribed.”66 Application of a law is ex post facto if it 
exhibits two qualities: first, “it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment;” and second, “it must disadvantage the offender affected 
by it.”67 Courts considering the mandatory-revocation challenges concluded that the law 
clearly disadvantaged the defendants because the trial judges presiding over their cases 
would otherwise have had discretion to forgo revocation.68 Whether the law was 
retrospective turned on what revocation was meant to punish. 
                                                          
and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, Sec. 110505 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(2) (requiring 
judges to revoke the release of defendants who possess a firearm). 
 61. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 812, (2001) (codified at § 3583(j)). 
 62. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 101 (2003). 
 63. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 109B, 210. 
 64. Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Sec. 7303. Revocation for possession of a controlled 
substance remains mandatory, but Congress eliminated a requirement that re-imprisonment term run at least one-
third the length of the authorized term of supervised release. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, Sec. 110505. 
 65. See United. States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d Cir. 
1994; United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Flora, 810 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ky. 1993). 
 66. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (internal quotations omitted) (interpreting U.S. Const., art. 1, 
§ 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”) and U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass 
any . . . ex post facto Law. . . .”)). 
 67. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 (1981) (footnotes omitted). 
 68. See, e.g., Paskow, 11 F.3d at 877. 
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The defendants argued that their original sentences included terms of supervised 
release, so revocation of that release must have been punishment for their original 
offenses.69 Viewed this way, application of the mandatory minimum to their cases was 
necessarily retrospective because it served to aggravate punishment for conduct that 
occurred before the law was in place. The government, on the other hand, argued that the 
law was not retrospective because the defendants had engaged in the conduct leading to 
revocation after the amendment was in effect.70 Most of the circuit courts to consider the 
issue sided with the defendants,71 but the Sixth Circuit ruled for the government, 
concluding that revocation was punishment for the conduct leading to the revocation.72 
The Supreme Court initially declined to resolve the conflicting conceptions of 
supervised release,73 but the issue arose again after Congress further amended the statute 
in 1994, this time adding a provision that explicitly authorized judges to impose an 
additional term of supervision along with a prison term when revoking a defendant’s initial 
term of supervised release.74 As with the mandatory-revocation amendment, a series of ex 
post facto challenges ensued.75 This time, the Court decided the conflict had to be resolved 
and granted certiorari in Johnson v. United States.76 
1. The Stakes 
As the Court took up Johnson, more hung in the balance than the fate of the ex post 
facto challengers. Several aspects of the supervised release system could only be justified 
if the law viewed revocation as punishment for a defendant’s original offense.77 
First, the statute provided that conduct need not be criminal in order to constitute a 
violation of a defendant’s supervised release.78 This would not be possible if post-
                                                          
 69. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 585–86; Paskow, 11 F.3d at 880; Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1118. 
 70. See Reese, 71 F.3d at 585–86; Paskow, 11 F.3d at 880; Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1122. 
 71. See Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1121; Paskow, 11 F.3d at 880; United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 526–27 (4th 
Cir. 1992). 
 72. Reese, 71 F.3d at 590. 
 73. See Reese v. United States, 518 U.S. 1007 (1996) (denying certiorari). 
 74. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, § 110505. Prior to the 
1994 amendment, the parameters of a revocation sentence were limited to § 3583(e). At the time, § 3583(e) 
provided that, after finding a defendant to have violated his terms of release, a judge could “revoke [the] term of 
supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release without 
credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision . . . .” 18 US.C. § 3583(e) (1994). Courts were split 
as to whether this authorized the imposition of an additional term of supervision after the defendant’s re-release. 
Nine circuits held that it did not. See United States v. Koehler, 973 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Malesic, 18 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Cooper, 962 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Holmes, 954 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Truss, 4 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. McGee, 
981 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Rockwell, 984 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tatum, 998 F.2d 893 (11th 1993). Two, the First and 
the Eighth, found that § 3583(e) did authorize an additional period of supervision. See United States v. O’Neil, 
11 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Schrader, 973 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 75. See United States v. Page, 131 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Collins, 118 F.3d 1394 (9th 
Cir.1997); United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854 (7th Cir.1996). 
 76. 529 U.S. 694 (2000). 
 77. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (1994) (“The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release . . . 
any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b) and any other condition it 
considers to be appropriate . . . .”). Section 3563(b) lists a number of discretionary conditions that judges may 
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revocation imprisonment were punishment merely for the conduct leading to the 
revocation.79 The Second Circuit reasoned that, “[i]f the individual may be punished for 
an action that is not of itself a crime, the rationale must be that the punishment is part of 
the sanction for the original conduct that was a crime.”80 
Second, when the violative conduct was itself criminal, a defendant could both have 
his release revoked and be prosecuted separately for the offense constituting the 
violation.81 If revocation were punishment for the violative conduct, that conduct could 
not be prosecuted later as a separate offense without resulting in double jeopardy.82 
Finally, defendants facing revocation of supervised release had no right to a jury trial 
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.83 Courts justified this practice by pointing to a pair 
of parole-era Supreme Court cases in which the Court held that defendants facing 
revocation were not entitled to the full slate of constitutional protections normally due a 
defendant facing criminal prosecution.84 In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court noted that 
parole occurred after the criminal prosecution, when the imposition of a sentence had 
already taken place.85 Because revocation was not part of a criminal prosecution, “the full 
panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding,” including the right to a jury trial, 
did not apply.86 The Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed some 
level of process because a defendant had a liberty interest in not seeing his parole revoked 
unjustly, but that interest, given the many restrictions parole imposed upon a parolee’s 
freedom, was diminished compared to that of a pre-conviction defendant.87 Because his 
liberty interest was diminished, he was entitled to diminished procedural protections.88 In 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court extended Morrissey’s holding to probation 
proceedings, noting that a probationer, like a parolee, has already been prosecuted.89 
Although the Court has never explicitly extended Morrissey-Gagnon to the revocation of 
supervised release, the circuit courts have done so uniformly.90 
If the Court were to hold in Johnson that revocation was punishment for violating 
supervised release, the rationale for these constitutional forbearances would fall apart. 
                                                          
impose, such as forbidding a defendant “from frequenting specified kinds of places or from associating 
unnecessarily with specified persons.” 
 79. Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1122. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See, e.g., Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1123. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
 86. Id. at 480. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 482–83; see id. at 489 (holding that a revocation hearing required only “(a) written notice of the 
claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral 
and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 
parole.”). 
 89. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117 (2d. Cir. 1994). 
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2. The Decision 
The defendant in Johnson was convicted for his participation in a conspiracy to 
commit credit card fraud.91 In addition to a prison sentence, the district court ordered 
Johnson to serve a three-year term of supervised release.92 While serving that release term, 
authorities arrested Johnson again, this time for forgery.93 The district court revoked and 
ordered Johnson to submit to another twelve months of supervision upon his release.94 
Johnson appealed the trial court’s imposition of the additional supervision term, 
arguing that the 1994 amendment, which provided for such terms, had not been in place 
when he committed the credit card offense in 1993.95 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
additional term, holding that its application was not ex post facto because the term was 
punishment for the forgery, which Johnson committed after Congress added the 1994 
amendment.96 
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Sixth Circuit’s ex post facto 
ruling,97 reasoning that, although it had “some intuitive appeal,” the Sixth Circuit’s 
holding raised “serious constitutional questions” with respect to the issues mentioned 
above—imprisonment for noncriminal conduct, reduced procedural rights for defendants, 
and double jeopardy.98 Treating revocation as punishment for the original crime, the 
approach followed by the majority of lower courts, “avoid[ed] these difficulties.”99 
The Court’s reasoning was almost entirely negative, focusing on the consequences 
that would arise should it hold revocation to be punishment for a defendant’s violative 
conduct. Its affirmative argument for treating revocation as punishment for the original 
offense was limited to a single reference to the Court’s summary affirmance of a 1969 case 
called Greenfield v. Scafati,100 which several of the circuit courts had similarly relied on 
for guidance.101 In Greenfield, a three-judge panel barred the application of an amended 
parole statute to a defendant whose original offense occurred before the amendment was 
enacted, reasoning that the timing of parole eligibility was part of a defendant’s 
                                                          
 91. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 697 (2000). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 698. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 698–99. 
 97. See id. at 700. The Court unanimously rejected the Sixth Court’s holding with respect to the ex post facto 
challenge. However, a divided Court held that that a judge already had authority under the pre-1994 statute to 
impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of a defendant who violated the 
conditions of his initial term. Id. at 713. 
 98. Id. at 700. 
 99. Id.  (citing United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 244–45 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 
854, 859–60 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 100. Id. at 701 (citing Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), summarily 
aff’d, 390 U.S. 713 (1968)). In Greenfield, the statute at issue delayed the point at which re-imprisoned parole 
violators could begin earning good-time credit, which had the effect of delaying their presumptive release dates. 
277 F. Supp. 644, 645. Under the ex post facto Clause, a change in the law cannot extend a defendant’s sentence 
beyond that which was permitted under the law as it existed on the date of his offense. Id. The court reasoned 
that, because the right to accumulate good time was part of the sentence for the defendant’s original offense, and 
he committed that offense before the law was enacted, the law could not apply to him. Id. 
 101. See Beals, 87 F.3d at 859; Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1120; United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
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sentence.102 
Curiously, neither the Johnson Court nor the circuits it followed looked to the 
structure of the supervised release statute for clues as to what revocation was actually 
punishing. The Sixth Circuit had done so, however, in United States v. Reese, the ex post 
facto case that created the circuit split ultimately resolved in Johnson.103 In Reese, the 
court noted that, under a parole system, revocation never results in prison time that exceeds 
the penalty handed down in the original sentence.104 If someone is sentenced to nine years 
in prison and released on parole after three, the court reasoned, revocation can result in no 
more than six years of re-imprisonment. By contrast, revocation of supervised release can 
result in a longer prison term than the one originally imposed or a cumulative punishment 
that exceeds the maximum sentence otherwise allowed by law.105 The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that, because the revocation term could exceed “the maximum incarceration 
period that attaches to the original offense,” revocation could not be said to punish that 
same offense.106 Put another way, if revocation punished the original offense, then the 
ensuing prison term would be limited according to the maximum term authorized for that 
offense. Since that did not appear to be the case, revocation had to be punishment for the 
violation.107 
Despite the logical coherence of that argument, it had one flaw: the Sixth Circuit 
cited no authority to support the proposition that the “maximum” penalty for an offense 
attaches when a jury returns its verdict and cannot be subsequently increased based on a 
later factual determination made by the judge. The court may have deemed such a citation 
unnecessary, given that, for many years, it was taken for granted that it was the jury’s 
findings, not the judge’s, that determined the scope of a defendant’s potential 
punishment.108 However, by the time the Sixth Circuit decided Reese in the mid 1990s, 
increasingly aggressive sentencing statutes had begun to call that assumption into 
question. These laws forced the Supreme Court to define the constitutional limits of 
judicial fact-finding during sentencing. 
B. The Apprendi Line: Judicial Fact-Finding and the Boundaries of Sentencing 
Discretion 
One of the hallmarks of penal theory’s rehabilitation era, broad judicial discretion in 
                                                          
 102. Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644, 646 (D. Mass. 1967), summarily aff’d, 390 U.S. 713 (1968)). 
 103. United. States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 587–88 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 104. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3565 United States v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 466–67 (7th Cir. 1990)). The court’s 
discussion of this issue alternately refers to “parole” and “probation,” but the court’s illustration is clearly a 
reference to parole. 
 105. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Smeathers, 930 F.2d 18, 19 (8th Cir. 1991); Dillard, 910 
F.2d at 466-67 (7th Cir.1990)). When the Sixth Circuit decided Reese, the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
confined the available sentence to a narrow range within the wider range allowed under the code section defining 
an offense. In United States v. Booker, the Court held that the guidelines could not be binding. 543 U.S. 220, 220 
(2005). After Booker, judges could impose any sentence within the broad range established by Congress for each 
offense. 
 106. Reese, 71 F.3d at 588. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482–83 (2000) (noting the historic link between the 
“elements” of a crime and the punishment made available to a judge). 
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sentencing, had the secondary effect of establishing sentencing as a truly distinct 
procedural phase of criminal proceedings.109 During the retributive era, when the law 
tended to prescribe a particular punishment for each offense, the judge’s imposition of the 
sentence was little more than a ministerial act.110 However, as the rehabilitative theory of 
punishment gained prominence, and a defendant’s rehabilitative potential rather than his 
offense became the primary basis for sentencing, judges were expected to diagnose each 
defendant’s prospects individually.111 This presented a problem.  Some facts relevant to a 
defendant’s rehabilitative potential—ties to the community, character evidence, prior 
criminal history, etc.—were not admissible at trial. In order to facilitate the necessary fact-
finding, jurisdictions developed a bifurcated system consisting of the traditional 
prosecution phase, which served to attach guilt, and a separate sentencing phase, which 
served to guide the judge’s discretion in selecting the appropriate punishment. 112 
Although the facts presented during the sentencing phase could substantially affect 
the magnitude of a defendant’s punishment, his procedural rights were minimal.113 He had 
no right to confront witnesses providing information to the court,114 no right to submit 
disputed facts to a jury, and no right to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt.115 
Moreover, the judge’s sentence was practically unreviewable. So long as it fell within the 
broad range provided for in the applicable statute, a sentence would stand on appeal.116 
The power exerted by judges in this context garnered little scrutiny, in part due to 
the way in which “crimes” were defined and adjudicated.117 Each crime was defined by a 
set of elements—facts that, once proven, subjected a defendant to criminal liability and set 
the outer limits of his possible sentence.118 Because proof of these elements established 
guilt, rendering him subject to punishment, a defendant enjoyed full constitutional 
protection as to their proof.119 By contrast, because facts alleged at sentencing had no 
                                                          
 109. Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 302 (1992). 
 110. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (tracing the historical development of American sentencing). “The 
substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The 
judge was meant simply to impose that sentence (unless he thought in the circumstances that the sentence was 
so inappropriate that he should invoke the pardon process to commute it).” Id. 
 111. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 48 (1978). 
 112. See Herman, supra note 109, at 303 n.56. 
 113. See, e.g., Williams v. People of State of N.Y., 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) (“[W]e do not think the Federal 
Constitution restricts the view of the sentencing judge to the information received in open court. The due-process 
clause should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial 
procedure.”). 
 114. Id. at 251. See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (“[A] judge may appropriately 
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the 
source from which it may come.”). 
 115. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92, 93 (1986). 
 116. See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, §9.3 (“Where sentences are determined by trial judges, as they are in the 
vast majority of cases, they ride upon one of the most powerful and pervasive doctrines in the law of sentencing: 
any sentence within constitutional and statutory limits will be upheld on appeal as long as it was selected by the 
proper exercise of judicial discretion.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 117. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499–501, 518–20 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing 
the historic link between legislatively defined elements and the penalties available upon proof of those elements). 
 118. See id. at 519–20 (describing the historic link between legislatively defined elements and the penalties 
available upon proof of those elements). 
 119. See id. at 499–500 (2000) (describing the constitutional protections during the trial phase where elements 
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binding effect, a defendant was not entitled to demand those facts be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.120 
The distinction between the nature of the facts relevant to each phase of the trial 
began to blur in the 1980s, however, as legislators began to attach legally binding 
consequences to facts found during sentencing.121 Whereas such facts had previously 
served merely as a rationale to guide a judge’s discretion within the statutory range, 
“sentencing enhancements” served to move the boundaries of the range itself, either by 
imposing a mandatory minimum or by increasing the maximum available penalty.122 
These statutes seemed to be at odds with the traditional way crimes were defined.  If a jury 
convicts a defendant based on proof of certain facts during the trial phase, but a judge finds 
additional facts during sentencing that aggravate the defendant’s potential punishment, has 
not the judge effectively convicted him of a new crime? Confronted with the question for 
the first time in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Court’s answer was “no.”123 
1. Elements and Sentencing Factors: McMillan’s False Start 
In McMillan, the defendant challenged a 1982 Pennsylvania statute that attached a 
mandatory minimum of five years to certain felonies if the sentencing judge concluded 
that a perpetrator “visibly possessed a firearm” during the commission of the underlying 
offense.124 The Court upheld the statute, leaning heavily on statute’s language, which 
explicitly described visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor that came into 
play only after a defendant had been found guilty of the underlying offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.125 The Court reasoned that, in determining what facts qualified as 
“elements” that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, states were generally free to 
decide for themselves.126 
The Court cautioned that there were limits to how far a state might stretch the 
definition of a sentencing factor before running afoul of the Constitution.127 Due process 
would require certain facts to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the 
state’s chosen label for them.128 The Court reasoned that Pennsylvania’s law was 
permissible because it sought neither to establish a separate offense nor raise the statutory 
                                                          
of a crime must be proven); U.S. Const. amends. V, VI; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
 120. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 121. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236 (2005) (describing the birth of the legislative trend toward 
limiting judicial discretion based on certain facts found at sentencing). For a detailed—and highly critical—
evaluation of the Supreme Court’s response to this trend, see generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the 
Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
367 (2010). 
 122. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236. 
 123. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 124. Id. at 81. 
 125. Id. at 85–86. 
 126. Id. at 85. 
 127. Id. at 86. 
 128. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86 (referencing Winship’s holding that the Due Process Clause requires the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged). 
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maximum for the underlying offense.129 The sentencing enhancement, therefore, had not 
become the “tail which wags the dog.”130 
Justice Marshall, in a sternly worded dissent, accused the majority of abdicating its 
responsibility by deferring to the Pennsylvania legislature’s definition of what constituted 
an element of the crime.131 The Court’s failure to articulate a test for determining which 
facts were elements and which were sentencing factors left states free to define away 
elements of crimes in order to obviate procedural safeguards meant to protect the 
defendant.132 In subsequent years, legislatures did just that.133 
2. Apprendi: When It Comes to Sentencing, It Is All Elementary 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court finally drew a bright line between elements, 
which had to be found by a jury, and sentencing factors, which could be found by a 
judge.134 The defendant in Apprendi fired a gun at the house of a black family that had 
recently moved into his all-white neighborhood, leading to his guilty plea on several 
charges, including possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carried a 
possible prison sentence of five to ten years.135 At sentencing, the trial court found that 
the defendant’s motive was racist intimidation, triggering New Jersey’s hate-crime 
sentencing enhancement, which increased the basic sentencing range of five to ten years 
to an enhanced range of ten to twenty years.136 
On appeal, a divided Court overturned the sentence, holding that the statute violated 
the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.137 The Court reasoned that New 
Jersey’s statutory scheme attached one penalty to unlawful possession of a firearm and an 
additional penalty if done so for the purpose of racially motivated intimidation.138 Fairness 
seemed to dictate that the procedural safeguards protecting the defendant with respect to 
the first allegation ought to protect him with respect to the second.139 In a clear disavowal 
of the deference it had shown the statutory language in McMillan, the Court said that New 
Jersey’s choice to call one fact an “element” and the other a “sentence enhancement” was 
not a principled way to distinguish one from the other.140 
The Court pointed to the “historic link” between the facts proven to the jury and the 
limits placed on the penalties available to a judge.141 In the early days of the Republic, the 
link was direct: each offense carried a specific sentence.142 If a statute attached a “higher 
degree of punishment” to a common-law felony when committed under particular 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 88. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236 (2005). 
 134. 530 U.S. 466, 525 (2000). 
 135. Id. at 469. 
 136. Id. at 470. 
 137. Id. at 476. 
 138. Id. at 476. 
 139. Apprendi, 530 U.S at 476. 
 140. Id.. 
 141. Id. at 482–83. 
 142. Id. at 479. 
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circumstances, the government was required to allege the existence of those aggravating 
circumstances in the indictment and prove them at trial.143 The trouble with New Jersey’s 
statute was its attempt to extend the judge’s sentencing discretion beyond the boundaries 
established by the facts reflected in the jury verdict, converting an offense that would 
normally carry a ten-year maximum into one with a twenty-year maximum.144 While a 
judge had discretion to impose a sentence within the range established by the legislature, 
his role in sentencing was constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the 
indictment and found by the jury.145 The Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”146 
3. Apprendi’s Long Shadow 
Apprendi resulted in some odd voting coalitions. The majority consisted of Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas, a mix of conventionally liberal and 
conservative thinkers,147 and a similarly odd collection of allies joined together in 
dissent.148 Apprendi’s implications for sentencing reform may help to explain the unlikely 
alliances. Although the majority’s holding favored the defendant in the narrow sense, its 
reasoning threatened to undermine structured-sentencing reforms like the federal 
sentencing guidelines,149 making Apprendi a referendum on the reform movement as 
much as a case about sentencing enhancements. 
Judicial fact-finding was central to the structured-sentencing schemes that began to 
proliferate in the 1970s as the rehabilitation theory of punishment fell out of fashion.150 
These systems, including the one Congress adopted as part of Senator Kennedy’s sweeping 
1984 reform package, sought to normalize sentencing by guiding judicial discretion within 
the broad statutory ranges that had become the norm when punishment was meant to be 
tailored to the individual defendant rather than his crime.151 Rather than leave judges to 
determine which aggravating or mitigating circumstances to consider, structured 
sentencing sought to systematize the role these facts played in determining a defendant’s 
punishment. The schemes differed in their particulars, notably as to the degree judges 
retained discretion, but all placed new importance on the role of judicial fact-finding at 
sentencing.152 
Under the federal system, binding sentencing guidelines codified an array of 
                                                          
 143. Id. at 480. 
 144. Apprendi, 530 U.S at 474. 
 145. Id. at 483 n.10. 
 146. Id. at 490. 
 147. Id. at 468. 
 148. Justice O’Connor wrote the case’s first dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Breyer. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523–55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a second dissent, 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist also joined. See id. at 555–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 149. See id. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 150. See Bowman, supra note 121, at 375–76.  
 151. Id. at 375. 
 152. Id. at 376. Note that, although structured sentencing arose at the same time determinate-sentencing 
regained currency among penal theorists, the two are not synonymous. A structured-sentencing system could 
limit judicial discretion but also incorporate the use of parole. Id. at 376 n.37. 
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variables relevant to a defendant’s relative culpability—e.g. his role in the crime, use of a 
weapon, etc.—and set up a formula dictating their effect on a defendant’s sentence.153 The 
elements comprising the defendant’s offense of conviction served as a starting point, but 
judges were to consider all the relevant facts, many of which would not have been formally 
alleged at trial.154 The judge’s factual determinations, as applied under the guidelines 
formula, produced a narrow presumptive sentencing range within the broader statutory 
range available for the defendant’s actual crime of conviction.155 Although a judge could 
depart from that presumptive range, she could do so only under limited circumstances, and 
such departures rendered her sentence subject to appellate review.156 
With that in mind, recall the Court’s central holding in Apprendi: “Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”157 As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent, everything depends on 
how one defines “statutory maximum.”158 A formalist reading—interpreting “statutory 
maximum” to mean nothing more than the maximum penalty authorized by statute for the 
underlying crime—would render the holding meaningless. Justice O’Connor observed 
that, were the holding taken at face value in this way, New Jersey could have moved its 
hate-crime enhancement outside the Apprendi majority’s rule simply by reformulating the 
statute’s structure.159 Under the existing scheme, the underlying firearms charge carried a 
penalty of five to ten years, which the hate-crime statute provided could be enhanced to a 
range of ten to twenty years upon the judge’s finding of the requisite racist motive. The 
state could just as easily have inverted the structure so that violation of the relevant 
enumerated offense carried a base range of five to twenty years, while a separate 
sentencing statute forbid the imposition of anything more than ten years unless the 
sentencing judge found that the necessary motive. This scheme, despite leaving the same 
pivotal factual determination to the judge, would have satisfied a formalist reading of the 
majority’s holding in Apprendi because the judicial finding would not raise the “statutory 
maximum” for the substantive offense. Instead, the finding would only limit the judge’s 
discretion to select a sentence within that range.  
Given the implausibility of such a formalistic understanding of the holding, Justice 
O’Connor reasoned that “statutory maximum” clearly meant something more than the 
maximum penalty as described by legislative fiat.160 After all, the very purpose of the 
holding was to establish a principled means by which one could distinguish an “element” 
from a “sentencing factor,”161 and the majority had explicitly renounced a formalistic 
                                                          
 153. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2000). 
 154. See Id. 
 155. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2004) (discussing the application of the guidelines to a 
defendant accused of possessing a controlled substance). 
 156. Id. at 261. 
 157. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 539–41(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 541. 
 160. Id. at 543–44. 
 161. See Id. at 476 (majority opinion) (reasoning that a legislature’s decision to call a fact a “sentence 
enhancement” rather than an element was not a principled basis for distinguishing them with respect to a 
defendant’s constitutional protections). 
19
McClendon: Supervising Supervised Release: Where the Courts Went Wrong on Re
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018
MCCLENDON-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  3:16 PM 
194 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:175 
approach to distinguishing the two, declaring that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, 
but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than 
that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”162 Justice O’Connor concluded, therefore, 
that it wasn’t the “statutory maximum” that mattered, but the maximum a court could 
impose absent the judge’s additional factual finding.163 Read this way, the Court’s holding 
would not just undermine systems like New Jersey’s, where a judge’s factual 
determination exposed a defendant to punishment beyond a clearly defined statutory 
maximum. It would also undermine structured sentencing schemes like the federal 
sentencing guidelines, which operated like a more complicated version of the hypothetical 
workaround for New Jersey’s hate-crime enhancement. In both schemes, the jury’s 
findings established guilt, subjecting the defendant to punishment within the broad 
statutory range for his “crime,” but additional findings by the judge bound his sentencing 
discretion within that range. Justice O’Connor predicted that, if her understanding of the 
Court’s rule in Apprendi were correct, it would “have the effect of invalidating significant 
sentencing reform accomplished at the federal and state levels over the past three 
decades.”164 She did not have to wait long to be proven right. 
4. Blakely-Booker: When the ‘Statutory Maximum’ Is Not the Maximum in the 
Statute 
Four years after Apprendi, the Court extended its holding to strike down 
Washington’s structured sentencing scheme.165 In Blakely v. Washington, the defendant 
abducted his estranged wife from their rural home, leading him to plead guilty to second-
degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm.166 Although he 
stipulated to the elements of the kidnapping charge and to his use of the firearm, he 
admitted to no other facts.167 
The constitutional issue arose from the trial judge’s decision to depart from the 
state’s sentencing guidelines. The state’s criminal code classified second-degree 
kidnapping as a class B felony punishable by up to ten years in prison, but binding 
sentencing guidlines computed a presumptive range of forty-nine to fifty-three months 
(about four and one-half years) based on the relative seriousness of the kidnapping charge, 
Blakely’s criminal history, and his use of the firearm.168 Rather than select a sentence 
within that range, the judge imposed a sentence of ninety months, three years longer than 
the presumptive range called for by the guidelines.169 The judge concluded that the 
sentence was permissible because testimony offered at sentencing showed the defendant 
had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” a statutory ground for departure from the presumptive 
range.170 
                                                          
 162. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. 
 163. Id. at 543 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. 549. 
 165. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 166. Id. at 298. 
 167. Id. at 299. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. 
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss1/9
MCCLENDON-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  3:16 PM 
2018] SUPERVISING SUPERVISED RELEASE 195 
On appeal, the Court overturned the defendant’s sentence, holding that it violated 
Apprendi.171 The state had argued that there could be no Apprendi violation because, 
although the defendant’s sentence departed from the range prescribed by the guidelines, it 
remained within the statutory range for his crime. The Court rejected this reasoning,172 
interpreting Apprendi’s holding exactly as O’Connor had predicted. For Apprendi 
purposes, the Court explained, “the ‘statutory maximum’ is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.”173 The relevant “maximum,” in other words, was not the maximum sentence 
a judge could impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he could impose 
without any additional findings.174 The Apprendi maximum in this case was therefore 
fifty-three months, the maximum the judge was authorized to impose based on the 
stipulated facts alone.175 Because the judge’s finding of deliberate cruelty increased the 
amount of punishment to which the defendant would otherwise have been subject, the 
state’s sentencing scheme violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.176 
In United States v. Booker, decided just a year after Blakely, the Court extended its 
holding to partially invalidate the federal sentencing guidelines, which were similar to 
those in Washington.177 Rather than strike the system down in its entirety, the Court opted 
to excise the provisions making the guidelines mandatory, reasoning that it was their 
binding nature that had rendered them unconstitutional.178 
To understand why it was the binding nature of the guidelines that caused the conflict 
with Apprendi, consider the case of the first defendant in Booker, who was convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.179 The possession statute that Booker 
violated set a sentencing range of ten years to life for any quantity exceeding fifty grams, 
but the sentencing guidelines computed a narrower range based on the specific quantity 
that the defendant actually possessed. At trial, prosecutors had presented evidence that 
Booker possessed 92.5 grams, setting the maximum under the guidelines at 262 months. 
At sentencing, however, prosecutors alleged that he had actually possessed an additional 
566 grams of crack and obstructed justice during the investigation.180 Based on the judge’s 
finding that the allegations were supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented 
during sentencing, the guidelines computed a new range of thirty years to life.181 
This shift rendered Booker’s sentence unconstitutional. The jury verdict alone, 
which reflected his possession of 92.5 grams of crack, authorized a prison term of no more 
than 262 months. But for the judge’s subsequent findings at sentencing, the mandatory 
                                                          
 171. Id. at 301 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).  “Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S., 490. 
 172. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. 
 173. Id. at 303. 
 174. Id. 303–04. 
 175. Id. at 304. 
 176. Id. at 305. 
 177. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 178. Id. at 245. 
 179. Id. at 227. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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guidelines would have obliged him to select a sentence falling under that limit. By making 
one sentence available based on the jury’s findings and another based on the judge’s 
findings, the guidelines violated Booker’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.182 
Had the guidelines been discretionary, the judge’s thirty-year sentence would have 
presented no such constitutional problem.183 The generic statutory range for possession 
with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine was, after all, between ten 
years and life in prison. 184 In selecting a sentence within that range, the judge would have 
been free to consider whatever facts he felt relevant, including evidence that the defendant 
had actually possessed another 556 grams of crack and obstructed justice.185 
5. Bringing Up the Rear: Alleyne Addresses Apprendi’s Mandatory Minimum 
Problem 
Although the Court in Apprendi finally announced a clear rule defining which facts 
had to be presented to a jury, the rule was logically unsatisfying. The Court’s principal 
distinction between a sentencing fact and an element was the effect of that fact on the 
boundaries of the judge’s sentencing discretion186: “It is unconstitutional for a legislature 
to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of 
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is . . . clear that such facts must be 
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”187 This would seem to endorse the 
proposition that a fact’s effect at the low end of the sentencing range is just as important 
as its effect at the high end. Yet, in announcing its holding, the Court concluded that only 
a fact that impacts the “statutory maximum” had to be presented to a jury.188 This 
formulation preserved McMillan, which involved a mandatory minimum, but did so at the 
cost of logical consistency.189 It is not obvious why a fact that increases the sentence a 
judge may impose is deserving of more consideration than a fact that increases the sentence 
a judge must impose. 
In Apprendi, Justice Thomas had argued in a concurring opinion that facts triggering 
a mandatory minimum were also elements that had to be presented to the jury.190 He 
                                                          
 182. Booker, 543 U.S. at 235. 
 183. Id. at 234. 
 184. See 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 185. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (“When a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence 
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems 
relevant.”). 
 186. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000) (“The judge’s role in sentencing is 
constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury. Put simply, facts that 
expose a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed [are] by definition ‘elements’ 
of a separate legal offense.”). 
 187. Id. at 490 (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252–53 (1999)). 
 188. Id. at 489. 
 189. See id. at 487 n.13 (“Conscious of the likelihood that legislative decisions may have been made in reliance 
on McMillan, we reserve for another day the question whether stare decisis considerations preclude 
reconsideration of its narrower holding.”). It is possible that Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion in Apprendi, 
needed to preserve McMillan in order to secure the vote of Justice Scalia, who had previously embraced the 
Court’s holding in that case. See Bowman, supra note 121, at 401–02; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224, 252–53 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (endorsing McMillan’s reasoning that a fact triggering a 
mandatory minimum need not be presented to a jury because it did not alter the maximum available penalty). 
 190. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521–22 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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reasoned that, although a mandatory minimum necessarily falls within the range 
prescribed for the underlying offense, it narrows the scope of the sentencing judge’s 
discretion.191 Because a fact triggering a mandatory minimum effectively eliminates the 
opportunity for a defendant to benefit from judicial discretion, the fact must be viewed as 
among those that the government seeks to punish, and facts that the government seeks to 
punish are elements of the crime.192 
Justice Thomas apparently lacked the votes necessary to win the day in Apprendi, 
but thirteen years later he found a coalition of justices willing to extend its holding to 
mandatory minimums, effectively overturning McMillan.193 In Alleyne v. United States, 
the Court held that, because mandatory minimum sentences also increase the penalty for a 
crime, any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is also an “element” that must be 
submitted to the jury.194 
IV.  HAYMOND: JOHNSON AND APPRENDI COLLIDE 
In 2015, federal officials raided the Tulsa home of eighteen-year-old Andre Ralph 
Haymond, who was free on supervised release after serving time for possession of child 
pornography.195 When a subsequent forensic search of the data on his smartphone 
uncovered fifty-nine images of child pornography, Haymond’s probation officer 
petitioned for revocation on the grounds that renewed possession of child pornography 
violated the terms of Haymond’s release.196   
The possession allegation rendered Haymond’s position particularly precarious. A 
judge is usually free to decide whether revocation is appropriate,197 and revocation terms 
are generally capped at five years, even for the most serious offenses,198 but, as a sex 
offender, Haymond was eligible for revocation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which provides 
for mandatory revocation and a minimum revocation sentence of five years when the 
violation stems from an enumerated sex offense. Because the provision places no upper 
limit on the term of re-imprisonment, Haymond was facing potential lifetime 
imprisonment based on an allegation that the government needed only prove to a judge by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 199 
The district court judge presiding over the revocation hearing found the potential 
consequences troubling in the light of the relatively weak evidence against Haymond.200 
                                                          
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 102 (2013) (overturning Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 
(2002), a more recent mandatory minimum case that had upheld McMillan). 
 194. Id. 
 195. United States v. Haymond, No. 08-CR-201-TCK, 2016 WL 4094886, at *1–2 (N.D. Okla. 2016). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) (“The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 198. See id. (“[A] defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any 
such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release is a class 
A felony, more than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such 
offense is a class C or D felony, or more than one year in any other case.”). 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). 
 200. See United States v. Haymond, No. 08-CR-201-TCK, 2016 WL 4094886, at *10, *13 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 
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Although the government had shown that the images were stored on Haymond’s phone, 
the phone was infected with a virus that may have downloaded the images surreptitiously. 
The government had not proven definitively that Haymond had ever viewed them or that 
he even knew they were there.  “If this were a criminal trial and the Court were the jury, 
the United States would have lost,” the court stated in a lengthy opinion accompanying its 
order. “This highlights the Court’s concerns with § 3583(k) and the mandatory penalties 
it carries.”201 Nevertheless, the judge revoked Haymond’s release. Although the 
government had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Haymond had viewed any of 
the images, a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that he had viewed at 
least some of them.202 
On appeal, a divided Tenth Circuit panel vacated Haymond’s revocation sentence, 
holding § 3583(k) to be facially unconstitutional because (1) it changes the mandatory 
sentencing range to which a defendant is subject based on facts found by a judge rather 
than a jury, and (2) it punishes a defendant for subsequent conduct rather than for his 
original offense.203 
A. Changing the Mandatory Range 
The court held that, by imposing a mandatory minimum revocation term, § 3583(k) 
violated Alleyne, which forbids a judge’s factual determinations from altering a 
defendant’s mandatory sentencing range.204 A judge can make factual findings that 
influence her discretion to choose a sentence within the range, but those findings cannot 
serve to narrow the range itself.205 
The majority reasoned that, by mandating a term of reimprisonment, § 3583(k) 
increases the minimum sentence to which a defendant would otherwise be subject based 
solely on his original offense.206 Haymond’s original conviction authorized a term of zero 
to ten years,207 but the mandatory minimum in § 3583(k) required a revocation term of no 
less than five years.208 Therefore, the court reasoned, § 3583(k) “unquestionably” 
increased the minimum sentence to which Haymond was exposed from zero to five 
years.209 The court concluded that, because § 3583(k) imposes a mandatory minimum on 
a crime that would not otherwise have one, and does so based on a factual determination 
made by a judge rather than a jury, the provision violates the Sixth Amendment.210 
                                                          
2, 2016) (discussing the various ways in which the government had failed to properly support its claims that 
Haymond knowingly possessed many of the images on his phone). For a detailed discussion on the problem of 
proving possession of child pornography in the digital age, see generally Jane McBath, Trashing Our System of 
Justice? Overturning Jury Verdicts Where Evidence Is Found in the Computer’s Cache, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381 
(2012). 
 201. United States v. Haymond, No. 08-CR-201-TCK, 2016 WL 4094886, at *13 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2016). 
 202. Id. at *12–14. 
 203. United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 204. Id. (citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013)). 
 205. Id. (citing United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005)). 
 206. Id. at 1164. 
 207. Id. at 1164 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)). 
 208. Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1164–65. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at (citing Booker, 543 U.S at 244). 
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B. Punishing Violative Conduct 
The court further held that § 3583(k) violates “the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by 
expressly imposing an increased punishment for specific subsequent conduct.”211 Citing 
Johnson, the court noted that, in order to avoid constitutional concerns, revocation of 
supervised release had to punish the original offense rather than the conduct leading to 
revocation.212 The structure of § 3583(k) ran against that edict.213 Under § 3583(k), only 
the commission of one of the enumerated sex offenses triggers mandatory revocation.214 
Had Haymond violated the terms of his release by committing a crime not included in § 
3583(k) or by committing a technical violation, such as missing an appointment with his 
probation officer, he would have been subject to the statute’s general revocation provision, 
set out in § 3583(e).215 Under that provision, revocation would have been discretionary, 
with an absolute maximum penalty of two years, regardless of the reason for revocation.216 
By contrast, § 3583(k) tied the magnitude of the available punishment “directly to the 
nature of the new conduct that serves as the basis for the revocation.”217 The court 
reasoned that a penalty linked to the commission of a particular set of crimes must be 
viewed at least in part as punishment for the commission of those crimes.218 “[I]f we wish 
to maintain the premise that revocation of supervised release is a punishment for the 
original crime of conviction, Congress must set the authorized term of reimprisonment 
based on the severity of that original crime.”219 
The dissent objected to this interpretation of Johnson, chastising the majority for  
“fail[ing] to take the [Johnson] Court at its word.” 220 Under Johnson, the dissent argued, 
courts must view revocation as punishing the original offense, even if the revocation 
provision in question provides specific penalties for specific kinds of violations. To 
support this reading of Johnson, the dissent cited the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines 
Manual, which describes revocation as punishment for the defendant’s “breach of trust” 
and permits a sentencing judge to consider the nature of the violative conduct when 
measuring the extent of that breach.221 Congress, the dissent argued, was free to view the 
commission of certain crimes as especially serious breaches of trust warranting lengthier 
revocation.222 
This attack on the majority’s reasoning is fatally flawed. First, when assessing the 
constitutionality of a statute, it is not at all clear why courts should give any deference to 
the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of that statute. Second, to the extent the 
Commission’s guidance is relevant, the dissent flatly mischaracterized it. Two paragraphs 
                                                          
 211. Id. at 1165. 
 212. Id. at 1165 (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000)). 
 213. Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1165. 
 214. Id. at 1165 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)). 
 215. Id. at 1162. 
 216. Id. at (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). 
 217. Id. at 1166. 
 218. Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1166. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1170 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. at 1170–71.  
 222. Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1170. 
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after the passage cited by the dissent, the Commission instructs a sentencing judge to 
“sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited 
degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation . . . .”223 The Commission had 
considered tying revocation penalties to the offense constituting the violation but 
ultimately rejected that approach, concluding that “the court with jurisdiction over the 
criminal conduct leading to revocation is the more appropriate body to impose punishment 
for that new criminal conduct . . . .”224 Section 3583 ignores this guidance. By tying the 
availability of mandatory minimums and potential lifetime imprisonment to violations 
stemming from specific kinds of criminal conduct, the statute clearly seeks to punish that 
conduct. 
Finally, the dissent reads Johnson as establishing a per se rule that any post-
revocation penalty is attributable to the original offense, even if the penalty’s magnitude 
and availability is contingent on proof of subsequent conduct. This reading not only 
misconstrues Johnson,225 it would open the door to truly absurd results. Congress would 
be free to annex every offense from robbery to wire fraud into the supervised release 
statute, reclassifying each crime as a unique “breach of trust” meriting its own revocation 
penalty. Such a scheme could not reasonably be said to punish a defendant’s original 
offense, yet it would be perfectly permissible under the dissent’s understanding of 
Johnson. The Haymond majority’s reasoning, by contrast, establishes a clear limiting 
principle. 
V.  FOLLOWING HAYMOND’S LEAD 
Haymond represents a necessary first step toward establishing constitutional limits 
on the supervised release system. A reckoning with the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Johnson and the Apprendi line of cases was long overdue. However, the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding in Haymond was narrow, leaving intact other provisions and applications of 
supervised release that violate the same principles implicated by § 3583(k). Moreover, the 
Tenth Circuit’s reasoning is, in parts, unnecessarily complicated, which may lead other 
courts to mistakenly reject future challenges to the supervised release system. A defendant 
has the right under the Fifth and Sixth amendments to see the government prove, to a jury 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime he is alleged to have 
committed.226 If that right is to retain its vitality, the supervised release system must be 
reconciled with the principles established by the Court in Johnson and the Apprendi line. 
A. The Constitutional Limits of Supervised Release 
In Apprendi, the Court recognized that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments depend for 
                                                          
 223. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §7A3B(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (emphasis added) 
 224. Id. 
 225. The dissent’s faulty reading, which other circuits have similarly espoused, is rebutted at length below. 
See infra notes 259 to 264 and accompanying text.  
 226. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (“We have held that [the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments] require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every 
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
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their salience on the link between the facts proven during the prosecution phase and the 
scope of the punishment available during the sentencing phase.227 Apprendi’s rule, refined 
and expounded over the course of Blakely, Booker, and Alleyne, preserves this link by 
limiting judges’ ability make factual findings that increase the punishment to which 
defendants are exposed. The combined effect of these rules is to constrain a judge’s role 
in sentencing to the exercise of discretion within the range authorized by the facts admitted 
in a guilty plea or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.228 When a finding of fact 
aggravates the legally prescribed punishment by raising either boundary of the available 
sentencing range, that fact “forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be 
submitted to the jury.”229 
This principle is just as applicable in the context of revocation as it is in the context 
of a defendant’s initial sentencing. A revocation hearing consists of judicial fact-finding 
and the imposition of a penalty.230 Because that penalty, under Johnson, must be treated 
“as part of the penalty for the initial offense,”231 the revocation must not raise either 
boundary of the sentencing range authorized by the facts proven during the defendant’s 
original conviction. 232 Therefore, Johnson and the Apprendi line of cases, read together, 
necessarily prohibit (1) any provision making revocation of supervised release mandatory, 
and (2) any revocation provision that, as applied, would expose the defendant to 
punishment exceeding that authorized by the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or his 
guilty plea. 
1. Why Mandatory Revocation is Unconstitutional 
As the court explained in Haymond, mandatory revocation of supervised release 
results in a de facto increase to the defendant’s otherwise applicable mandatory minimum 
sentence. The mandatory revocation provision in § 3853(k) required the judge to sentence 
Haymond to no less than five years, yet the jury’s guilty verdict on the initial possession 
charge prescribed a range of zero to ten years. By transforming a crime that had no 
                                                          
 227. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2000) (discussing the need to keep fact-finding in 
the hands of the jury when proof of those facts exposes the defendant to the loss of liberty). 
 228. See id. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant . . . . In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (reasoning that 
“there is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the 
minimum[]” for the purposes of an Apprendi analysis). 
 229. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15. 
 230. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (“The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant 
to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted 
in such term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
violated a condition of supervised release. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 231. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). 
 232. See id. at 700–01 (holding that post-revocation penalties must be attributed to the original offense); 
Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 114–15 (holding that, when a finding of fact aggravates the legally prescribed punishment 
by raising either boundary of the available sentencing range, that fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a 
new offense and must be submitted to the jury). 
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mandatory minimum into one that had a minimum of five years, § 3853(k) aggravated 
Haymond’s sentence based on a fact not found by the jury.233 
The same dynamic plays out in any scenario where a provision calls for mandatory 
revocation. Imagine that Haymond had been convicted of selling child pornography, which 
carries a mandatory minimum of five years in prison, 234 and was subsequently revoked 
under a hypothetical provision providing for a mandatory revocation term of one day. The 
revocation would still increase the underlying offense’s mandatory minimum sentence—
extending it from five years to five years and a day. Thus, even when a defendant’s original 
conviction authorizes a mandatory minimum, a subsequent mandatory revocation 
aggravates the sentence by increasing that minimum. 
It is irrelevant that a defendant’s total prison sentence, including the mandatory 
revocation term, may fall under the Apprendi maximum set by his original conviction. In 
Haymond’s case, he was initially sentenced to thirty-eight months in prison. Together with 
his mandatory five-year revocation term, his total prison sentence was just over eight 
years, well short of the ten-year maximum authorized by the child pornography statute 
under which he was originally convicted.  The revocation was still unconstitutional 
because the statute narrowed the range within which the district judge could exercise his 
discretion based on a fact not found by the jury. As Justice Thomas explained in Alleyne, 
“It is no answer to say that the defendant could have received the same sentence with or 
without that [judicially found] fact.”235 “The essential point is that the aggravating fact 
produced a higher range . . . .”236 
2. Why the Available Revocation Term Must Not Exceed the Statutory Maximum 
A defendant’s prison sentence may consist of one or more segments: his initial 
prison term and any subsequent terms imposed after revocation of supervised release. 
Because any revocation term must be attributed to a defendant’s original offense, and the 
penalty available for that offense cannot be aggravated based on a fact found by the judge, 
any revocation that would expose the defendant to punishment beyond the statutory 
maximum for the original offense is unconstitutional. 
This principle may best be illustrated by a brief return to the hapless hiker 
hypothetical.237 After the hiker’s marijuana conviction, the judge imposed a sentence of 
five years in prison, the maximum allowed under the statute. Under a proper understanding 
of Johnson and Apprendi, the judge’s subsequent revocation term, imposed after the 
hiker’s cocaine arrest, would be unconstitutional. Although the hiker’s conviction on the 
marijuana charge authorized a term of supervised release, the judge was not free to revoke 
that release without first making a factual finding that the defendant had violated the 
conditions of his release.238 Recall that, for Apprendi purposes, “the relevant ‘statutory 
                                                          
 233. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 113 (“[I]t is impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribed 
floor aggravate the punishment.”). 
 234. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(3)(B). 
 235. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115. 
 236. Id. at 115–16. 
 237. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text. 
 238. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (“The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the 
defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 
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maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, 
but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”239 The hiker’s 
Apprendi maximum was therefore five years, which was exhausted over the course of his 
original prison term. By imposing an additional two years based on a fact not presented to 
the jury, the judge violated the hiker’s rights under the Due Process Clause and the Sixth 
Amendment. 
The Haymond court sidestepped the Apprendi maximum issue by analyzing § 3583’s 
mandatory-minimum provision under Alleyne,240 a clear punt, and one that could muddy 
the waters. Section 3583(k) quite obviously exposed Haymond to punishment beyond the 
range authorized by the facts reflected in his conviction for possession of child 
pornography. The provision would have allowed the judge to revoke Haymond’s release 
for life even though the facts proven to the jury authorized a maximum penalty of only ten 
years. Because a judge’s finding of fact must not expose a defendant to punishment beyond 
that made available by the facts proven during the prosecution phase, the trial court’s 
application of § 3583(k) was unconstitutional. Again, it is irrelevant that Haymond’s 
actual sentence fell within the authorized range. The constitutional problem arose from 
the factual finding’s effect on his potential sentence, i.e. the boundaries of the available 
sentencing range.241 Any fact that aggravates the penalty for a crime by exposing a 
defendant to punishment beyond the maximum authorized by the facts reflected in a 
defendant’s conviction must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.242 
B. The Faulty Reasoning of the Circuit Courts’ Apprendi Rejections 
The Tenth Circuit’s imposition of constitutional limits on supervised release makes 
Haymond an outlier. Courts have universally declined to apply the principles espoused in 
Apprendi and its progeny to the supervised release context.243 Even the Tenth Circuit had 
                                                          
resulted in such term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of supervised release.”) (emphasis added). 
 239. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (emphasis original). 
 240. The court’s discussion of a potential Apprendi maximum violation was relegated to a footnote. “It is 
enough for our purposes that the mandatory minimum is increased. Thus, we need not address whether this 
provision also increased the statutory maximum sentence to which Haymond was exposed.” United States v. 
Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 241. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 115 (2013) (“[I]f a judge were to find a fact that increased the 
statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately 
received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range (i.e., the range applicable without that aggravating 
fact).”). 
 242. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 243. See United States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 
1264 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 356 F. App’x 785 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cordova, 
461 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Carlton, 
442 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Hinson United, 429 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484 (1st Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Coleman, 404 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 2005); cf. United States v. Ward, 770 F.3d 1090 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting 
a defendant’s argument that Alleyne rendered his mandatory revocation unconstitutional). 
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previously declined to extend the Apprendi line to supervised release. 244  The apparent 
uniformity is something of a mirage, however, as many of the underlying claims in those 
cases did not cleanly present the Apprendi issue, either because the defendant failed to 
properly frame his argument or because he did not have a valid Apprendi claim to begin 
with.245 Moreover, those circuits that have rejected genuine, properly argued Apprendi 
challenges often did so relying on pre-Apprendi authority or cases involving dubious 
arguments.246 To the extent that the circuits have squarely addressed the Apprendi issue, 
they have relied on one or more of the arguments described below. None are particularly 
convincing. 
1. Argument One: Re-Imprisonment Is a Distinct Aspect of the Sentence 
Five circuits have reasoned, to varying degrees of explicitness, that a defendant’s 
revocation term does not stack on top of his initial prison term because the two form 
distinct components of the defendant’s original sentence.247 The First Circuit’s decision 
in United States v. Work provides the most thoroughly argued example of this position.248 
In Work, the court claimed that the defendant, in arguing that his revocation term 
should be limited by the term he had already served, mistakenly equated two “statutorily 
distinct modes of punishment.”249 The court reasoned that a term of supervised release is 
one of “several different forms of punishment,” such as a fine or mandatory payment to 
the federal Victims Compensation Fund, that a judge may impose in addition to prison 
time.250 Because supervised release is merely one of several independent elements of the 
defendant’s sentence, “any term of incarceration authorized under the supervised release 
statute is not limited by reference to the actual term of incarceration served by a defendant 
                                                          
 244. See Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1186. In Haymond, the Tenth Circuit attempted, somewhat unconvincingly, to 
reconcile its decision in that case with its decision in Cordova, where it held that Apprendi did not forbid judge-
found facts at revocation, even when the determination extended the defendant’s prison sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum. See Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1163 (citing Cordova, 461 F.3d at 1186–88)). The court reasoned 
that, although Apprendi applied to the prosecution phase of the criminal proceeding, Booker applied to sentencing 
and required judges to retain discretion within the statutory range. Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1163–64. This is pure 
confusion. All the cases in the Apprendi line apply to both the prosecution phase and the sentencing phase in that 
they serve to fix the punishment available during sentencing to that authorized by the facts proven during the 
prosecution phase. See Part III.B of this note.   
 245. See, e.g., Johnson, 356 F. App’x at 792 (6th Cir. 2009) (revocation term of eighteen months did not 
exceed the thirty-year maximum authorized by his conviction for bank fraud); Appellant’s Brief at 11–13, United 
States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-6094), 2005 WL 2481779 (rather than argue that 
Apprendi forbids only those additional terms that exceed the maximum prison term authorized by the original 
conviction, defendant argued that Apprendi forbids any additional prison term based on a fact found by a judge); 
Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d at 1222 (9th Cir. 2006) (defendant argued that the sentencing judge was not 
authorized to impose supervised release in the first place and that Booker made Apprendi’s reasonable doubt 
requirement apply to revocations generally); Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 13–14, United States v. Carlton, 
442 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 2006) (defendant made only a policy argument that his revocation term violated the 
principles established in Apprendi and Booker because the government chose to prosecute his role in a bank 
robbery as a revocation rather than a traditional prosecution). 
 246. See, e.g., McIntosh, 630 F.3d at 703 (citing faulty challenges lodged in Carlton, Johnson, Huerta-
Pimental); Work, 409 F.3d. at 489 (citing a string of pre-Apprendi cases). 
 247. See McIntosh, 630 F.3d at 703; Dees, 467 F.3d at 854; Work, 409 F.3d at 489; Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 
at 1225; Johnson, 356 F. App’x at 791. 
 248. See Work, 409 F.3d at 489. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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pursuant to the substantive criminal statute applicable to the crime of conviction.”251 The 
court reasoned that supervised release, as a distinct element of the sentence authorized by 
the defendant’s original conviction, carries its own statutory maximum for Apprendi 
purposes (i.e. the maximum revocation term provided for in the revocation statute).252   
This argument is untenable. A fine is, by its very nature, different than a prison term. 
One causes a financial loss, the other a loss of liberty. Because a fine bears no relationship 
to imprisonment, one need not torture logic in order to conclude that the imposition of a 
fine need not be “limited by reference to the actual term of incarceration served by a 
defendant.”253 This cannot be said of post-revocation incarceration. There is no principled 
distinction to be made between an initial prison term and a revocation term; the clang of a 
prison door rings no less loudly when slammed for the second time.254 
Even if one were to concede that supervised release is a distinct mode of punishment, 
subject to its own Apprendi maximum, the First Circuit’s argument would still fall flat. As 
the Court explained in Blakely, “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may 
impose without any additional findings.”255 A jury’s guilty verdict authorizes the judge to 
impose a period of supervised release, but the defendant’s conviction alone does not 
authorize subsequent revocation.256 That authority exists exclusively upon a subsequent 
finding by the court that the defendant violated the conditions of his release.257 
Consequently, to the extent that supervised release is subject to its own Apprendi 
maximum, that maximum applies to the supervision term, not the revocation penalty.  
Unlike most circuits making this argument, the First Circuit recognized the 
distinction between a supervised release term, which is authorized by a defendant’s 
conviction alone, and the revocation, which is not.258 However, in an attempt to defang 
the legal significance of this distinction, the First Circuit turned to another frequently 
invoked argument. It too is unavailing. 
                                                          
 251. Id. at 490. 
 252. Id.  
 253. See Work, 409 F.3d at 490. 
 254. In order to bolster the argument that post-revocation imprisonment is a distinct form of punishment, other 
circuits make much of the fact that supervised release is governed by its own statute, apart from the statute 
establishing the criminal offense. See, e.g., United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
imposition of supervised release and the sanctions for violation are authorized by a statute and Guidelines scheme 
that is separate from the regime that governs incarceration for the original offense.”). Apprendi, however, made 
clear that such a formalistic distinction is spurious when assessing the constitutionality of a defendant’s 
punishment. The hate-crime enhancement at issue in Apprendi was also established in a statute separate from the 
one providing for the predicate offense. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468–69 (2000). “[T]he relevant 
inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment 
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” Id. at 494. 
 255. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (emphasis original) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 256. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), (e). 
 257. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). 
 258. See United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The appellant, ably represented, attempts 
to blunt the force of [the distinct-aspect] reasoning by shifting the focus to the revocation proceeding. He remarks 
that the court alone found the facts confirming the supervised release violations and notes that, absent those facts, 
the court would not have been authorized to revoke supervised release.”). 
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2. Argument Two: The Morrissey Parole Analogy 
The First Circuit argued that revocation based on judicial fact-finding did not offend 
the Constitution because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to revocation hearings, 
where defendants are protected only by diminished due process rights.259 Citing 
Morrissey, Gagnon, and Johnson, the court concluded that, “[t]he law is clear that once 
the original sentence has been imposed in a criminal case, further proceedings with respect 
to that sentence are not subject to Sixth Amendment protections.”260 Nearly every circuit 
to reject an Apprendi challenge has deployed a similar argument, citing Morrissey, 
Gagnon, Johnson, or a combination thereof.261 Their reliance is misplaced. 
Morrissey and Gagnon cannot be applied in the supervised release context without 
first accounting for the structural difference that distinguishes it from parole and probation, 
the systems at issue in those cases. Under Apprendi, when a factual determination exposes 
a defendant to punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed, the fact is an 
element of a separate legal offense.262 Revocation of parole or probation results in the re-
imposition of a defendant’s original sentence, 263 so the factual determination leading to 
revocation can never expose the defendant to more punishment than he might have 
received when he was initially sentenced. Revocation of supervised release, however, 
results in the imposition of a new prison term, one that the statute limits in absolute terms 
rather than as a function of the defendant’s initial prison sentence. Under this structure, a 
given revocation may or may not expose a defendant to a total prison sentence that exceeds 
the maximum allowed under the statute establishing his original offense. When the 
defendant’s exposure does not exceed this maximum, the Morrissey-Gagnon justification 
for reduced procedural protections holds up because the defendant faces no more 
punishment than he did after his original prosecution ended in conviction. However, when 
the defendant’s exposure does exceed the maximum penalty that was available upon his 
conviction, the fact triggering the additional exposure is, under Apprendi, an element of a 
separate legal offense, one for which the defendant cannot be punished but upon his 
admission of the fact or upon proof of its existence to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Rather than grapple with the implications of these structural differences, the First 
Circuit and others have attempted to deploy Johnson as a bridge extending Morrissey and 
Gagnon to supervised release.264 Johnson, the courts argued, held that revocation punishes 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 491–92. 
 260. Id. at 491 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); Johnson v. United States, 
529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)). 
 261. See United States v. Ward, 770 F.3d 1090, 1097 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 
1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 356 F. App’x 785, 792 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807, 809 (2d Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hinson , 429 F.3d 114, 
118 (5th Cir. 2005); Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 262.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2000).  
 263. See CAMPBELL, supra note 22, §5.1 (“Offenders sentenced to probation serve their time in the community 
instead of behind bars.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 677 (3d ed. 2007) (“[A] parolee 
continues to be subject to supervision for the remainder of his maximum term, and can be returned to prison if 
he violates his parole conditions . . . .”). 
 264. See United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., United States v. Hinson, 429 
F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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the original offense, so traditional procedural protections are not required.265 This is untrue 
as a matter of formal logic, as it confuses the necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
syllogism at work in Johnson. Johnson reasoned that, if the absence of procedural 
protections at revocation is justified, revocation necessarily punishes the original 
offense.266 It does not follow from this that, because revocation punishes the original 
offense, the absence of procedural protections is necessarily justified.   
Ultimately, courts cite Morrissey, Gagnon, and Johnson in order to refute a claim 
that a proper Apprendi challenge does not make. Apprendi does not stand for the 
proposition that a defendant’s rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
attach at revocation. It stands only for the proposition that the boundaries of a defendant’s 
potential punishment must be determined by the facts proven during the prosecution phase, 
where those rights do attach. When revocation respects those boundaries, the judge’s 
factual determination is permissible because it does not alter the scope of his sentencing 
discretion. Instead, the determination provides grounds for the judge to reconsider the 
manner in which he initially wielded that discretion. 
3. Argument Three: Booker Blessed the Constitutionality of Supervised Release 
A number of courts concluded that that the Supreme Court had already spoken on 
the issue of revocation in Booker.267 In striking those portions of the sentencing statute 
that made the guidelines binding, the Court declared that, “[m]ost of the statute is perfectly 
valid,” citing several provisions in the larger prison reform statute, including supervised 
release, that the Court did not consider to be problematic.268 Several circuits have reasoned 
that revocation could not violate Apprendi’s principles if, in announcing Booker, the 
apotheosis of those principles, the Court explicitly stamped its approval on the supervised 
release statute.269 
This argument is hollow. Booker’s passing reference to the supervised release statute 
was nothing more than an obiter dictum. The case was the culmination of two decades of 
debate focused exclusively on the effect of fact-finding during the sentencing phase of a 
trial. The Court had never so much as discussed the issue of judicial fact-finding at 
revocation and did not do so in Booker. The mention of supervised release was strictly an 
aside, an example of a statute that need not be struck down because it was unrelated to the 
guidelines’ binding nature, the source of their unconstitutionality.270 Given its negligible 
                                                          
 265. In Johnson, the Court does state that “treating post revocation sanctions as part of the punishment for the 
original offense” avoids “constitutional concerns,” id., but this cannot be read as a grant of permission for trial 
courts to impose punishment beyond the statutory maximum based on their own factual findings. The Court’s 
point was that every revocation would be unconstitutional if it punished violative conduct, not that every 
revocation is necessarily constitutional because it punishes the original offense. 
 266. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700. 
 267. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 356 F. App’x 785, 792 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dees, 467 
F.3d 847, 854 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing another court’s interpretation of Booker); United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 
114, 117 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 808 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Coleman, 
404 F.3d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 268. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) 
 269. See, e.g., Hinson, 429 F.3d at 117; United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 808 (2d Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Coleman, 404 F.3d 1103, 1105 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 270. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 258. Along with supervised release, the Court listed other code sections unrelated 
to the binding nature of the guidelines such as provisions providing for various kinds of punishment, presentence 
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role in Booker’s reasoning, the dictum’s weight as an authority in the revocation debate 
ranks somewhere between totally irrelevant and merely unpersuasive. 
4. Argument Four: Booker Only Invalidated Mandatory Guidelines 
Courts have often deployed the fourth and final argument in tandem with the 
third.271 According to this argument, Booker only invalidated the mandatory guidelines, 
which did not apply to supervised release. The Ninth Circuit put it this way: 
Because the revocation of supervised release and the subsequent imposition of additional 
imprisonment is, and always has been, fully discretionary, it is constitutional under Booker. 
See U.S.S.G. ch. 7 (promulgating advisory policy statements concerning violations of 
probation and supervised release) 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (authorizing, but not requiring, 
revocation and subsequent imprisonment following a violation of supervised release 
conditions).272 
This reasoning has several problems, not the least of which is its factual inaccuracy. 
While it is true that the sentencing guidelines were strictly advisory with respect to 
supervised release, the revocation statute itself is not “fully discretionary.” Although the 
general revocation provision cited by the court leaves the decision to the judge, a number 
of other provisions in the same code section provided for mandatory revocation.273 
Setting aside this misleading omission, the court’s reasoning betrays a fundamental 
misunderstanding of principles at work in the Apprendi line. Whether a fact must be found 
by the jury turns on the impact that fact has on the boundaries of a judge’s sentencing 
discretion. A sentencing provision violates Apprendi even when it permits, but does not 
require, the judge to impose a sentence beyond the range made available by the facts 
proven at trial. The statute at issue in Booker would have been unconstitutional even if it 
permitted but did not oblige the judge to depart from the presumptive range based on 
additional findings at sentencing.274 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s misunderstanding of 
Booker and its implication for the boundaries of sentencing discretion, five circuits have 
relied on essentially the same reasoning to reject Apprendi challenges.275 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in Haymond and affirm the Tenth 
Circuit’s holding that § 3583(k)’s mandatory revocation provision is unconstitutional. 
Moreover, although the question is not presented in Haymond, the Court should make clear 
that a revocation also violates Apprendi when it exposes the defendant to punishment in 
                                                          
reports, forfeiture, and the notification of victims. Id. 
 271. See, e.g., United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 854 (3d Cir. 2006); Hinson, 429 F.3d at 117 (5th Cir. 
2005); Carlton, 442 F.3d at 808; Coleman, 404 F.3d at 1104–05. 
 272. United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006) 
 273. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (making revocation mandatory for violations stemming from the possession 
of drugs or firearms). 
 274. This was the case in Blakely, where the sentencing provision permitted but did not require the judge to 
depart from the presumptive sentence upon his finding that a defendant acted with deliberate cruelty. Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004). 
 275. See Dees, 467 F.3d at 854; Carlton, 442 F.3d at 808; Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d at 1224; Hinson, 429 
F.3d at 117–18; Coleman, 404 F.3d at 1104; United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 492 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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excess of the statutory maximum for his underlying offense. When a defendant can be sent 
to prison for life without the benefit of a jury or the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, revocation has become “the tail that wags the dog.” The Court’s ongoing 
countenance of such a statute is not only repugnant to due process and the Sixth 
Amendment, it invites Congress to adopt similarly draconian provisions in the future. 
The interests advanced by supervised release arguably justify the legal fiction that 
revocation punishes a defendant’s original offense, but this justification rings false when 
the available penalty is directly tied to his subsequent conduct. If the law allows revocation 
penalties to overrun the banks established by an offender’s actual conviction, it is not a 
legal fiction to say that revocation punishes the original crime, it is a fiction tout court. 
—Robert McClendon* 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law, 2019. Many thanks to Dalton Downing for 
suggesting this topic and to Deric McClellan for his advice throughout the writing process. 
 
                                                          
35
McClendon: Supervising Supervised Release: Where the Courts Went Wrong on Re
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018
